This is a retraction. I no longer think that John Searle’s Chinese Room is trivial. It is a powerful demonstration of the failure of materialism to provide an adequate explanation for consciousness.
The Chinese Room is Searle’s most famous argument against materialism. He asks us to imagine that we are in a sealed room, communicating by text with the outside. We have a manual that allows us to respond to questions in Chinese even though we have no knowledge of the language. Or if asked in English we respond in the usual way.
Thus, we’d be answering English or Chinese appropriately. The outside observer can’t distunguish how we’re coming up with replies. But inside, the two are totally different. One is done mechanically, by rote, the other is done with awareness and thought. This is analogous to the observation of a person, obviously. Is there a mind responding or just mechanical response without consciousness?
Materialism says that only the physical exists. But such a view cannot account for the difference between response by some one who understands and mechanical responses. This seemingly most scientific and rational approach fails to admit the simple fact- we know that there is such a thing as awareness and consciousness because we experience it constantly. Any theory of mind that fails to account for it is incomplete.
Dualism accounts for consciousness, but in its separation of mind from material, it loses all of its explanatory power and becomes unacceptable.
Here’s what I wrote in the comments to Aaron Swartz’s description of the argument:
Searle’s Chinese Room experiment is a trivial misdirection. He focuses on the man in the room matching symbols rather than the creator of the semantic and syntactic translation rules. That designer was conscious. The man in the room is working unconsciously. When I speak my mouth and vocal cords do the translation from nerve impulses to sound patterns but it is entirely unconscious. You have to follow the trail back into the brain where you get lost because consciousness is an emergent property of the neural networks, not a property of the machinery at all.
posted by James Vornov on March 15, 2007 #
I don’t actually remember whether I wrote that before or after I read Searle’s The Rediscovery of the Mind, but at some point I did come to agree with him. The simple way out of the problem is to admit that mind does indeed exist. As evidenced by my comment, I had already decided that mind was real and it was emergent from brain activity. Interestingly, using different terminology, I think that Searle’s points out the same irreducibility in the later book, The Mind.
